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Abstract 
This paper studies the implementation of capital controls in Greece and examines their impact on 
consumption and imports. The dataset consists of the quarterly country-level macroeconomic 
variables, per capita final consumption expenditure of households, per capita imports of goods 
and services and per capita exports of goods and services, of 10 countries for the period 2010-
2016. The method applied and aiming to estimate the effect of capital controls is the synthetic 
control, which is based on the existence of an intervention of interest. Synthetic control method 
separates the timeline in pre- and post-capital controls periods and categorizes the countries in 
treated and untreated, and, using the characteristics of the untreated in the pre-intervention 
period, it creates a counterfactual that represents the trajectory of the treated country in the 
absence of the intervention. After applying the synthetic control twice, using consumption as the 
outcome variable at the first application and imports at the second, the findings show that there is 
a short-term negative effect of capital controls on both consumption and imports in Greece. 
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1. Introduction  
After the global financial crisis of 2008, the world economy starts to regenerate, creating capital 
movements back to emerging countries. Such capital flows, usually, help countries with fewer 
savings to attract foreign investors, promote the diversification of investment risk, foster 
intertemporal trade and help financial markets develop (Ostry et al., 2010). These capital 
movements can be inflows to a recipient country or outflows from a source country. However, 
these capital flows usually occur in surges and therefore they need to be controlled by the 
competent authorities so that they do not provoke instability to the economy.    
In Greece, capital controls were introduced at the end of June 2015 with the aim to halt the run of 
citizens on bank deposits, provoked by the instability of the political system (Samitas & Polyzos, 
2016). The European Central Bank, affected by the European debt crisis, froze the financial 
support towards the banks of Greece which resulted in the closing of the above-mentioned 
institutions and consecutively in the implementation of capital controls, whose purpose was the 
prevention of Greeks’ run to the banks (www.investopedia.com, 2017). These measures are still 
valid in Greece, although the restrictions are substantially relaxed, causing inconveniences in 
bank transactions and credit card payments. The regulations concern purchases with credit cards, 
which were impossible during the first period of the implementation, foreign financial transfers 
and daily cash withdrawals. At first, the maximum amount a citizen could withdraw was 60 
euros per day; subsequently it switched to 420 euros per week until recently, since when the limit 
has been 840 euros per fortnight. Such measures can lead to a plummet of consumption 
expenditure since individuals who prefer cash from alternative methods of payment, which is a 
usual phenomenon in Greece, cannot have access to their desirable amount of cash and therefore 
cannot proceed to purchases. Generally, the banking capital controls imposed in Greece concern 
the outflow of funds, and constitute a regular policy tool in emerging countries, limiting the cash 
circulation only inside the country (Samitas & Polyzos, 2016). Such regulations can have a 
negative effect on imports, as exporting countries are not guaranteed their payments so they may 
postpone their shipments or, even worse, cut off the trade routes.         
Capital controls are measures imposed by the government of a country in order to restrict capital 
inflows and outflows from the capital account of the country. They can be applied to all flows, 
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such as debt (bonds) and equity (stocks), and they vary depending on the type of the flow or its 
duration: short-, medium- or long-term (www.investopedia.com, 2017). The limitations to capital 
inflows can be in the form of specific instruments that aim to lessen capital flows into a specific 
industry or sector of an economy or into the economy in general (Buss, 2013). The different 
types can be exchange controls, taxes on foreign goods and services known as tariffs, transaction 
taxes (Tobin tax), definite prohibitions and volume limitations as well as restrictions on the 
amount of money that citizens can move out of a country (www.investopedia.com, 2017). 
Additionally, capital controls are not homogeneous since regulations on inflows and outflows are 
“policy tools with different purposes” (Andreasen, Schindler & Valenzuela, 2017). As Magud, 
Reinhart & Rogoff (2011) aptly state “Capital controls are a single policy instrument but there 
are many policy objectives”. Therefore, the existence of different kinds of restrictions means that 
we have different effects in financial markets, which implies that studies that use aggregate 
indices of capital controls may hide some asymmetries that render the estimation of average 
effects difficult, if not impossible (Andreasen, Schindler & Valenzuela, 2017). Since previous 
literature has proven that it is difficult to estimate average effects of capital controls, it is better 
to focus on each instance when capital controls are introduced separately, as this paper does with 
the case of capital controls in Greece.  
Capital controls induce controversial effects and this has created debates among the academics. 
The previous literature describes the effects of capital controls providing theoretical and 
empirical evidence that yields mixed results, rendering debates necessary and inevitable (Buss, 
2013). How effective capital controls can be depends on whether a country has already existing 
restrictions and thus the administrating procedure is already completed, whether an economy has 
closed capital accounts and consecutively it is easier to enforce restrictions and whether a 
country has open capital accounts, implying that it is necessary to design and introduce new 
regulations and make them stricter over time (Ostry et al., 2010). Capital controls may have 
potential positive effects from a macroeconomic perspective; nevertheless they restrict 
companies from having full access to foreign capitals, providing one more reason to the 
academics for showing that capital account restrictions are disastrous to financial markets and 
economic development (Andreasen, Schindler & Valenzuela, 2017). Furthermore, the impact of 
controls on capital outflows is ambiguous as on the one hand they restrict the movement of 
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national savings to foreign financial markets thus decreasing the cost of domestic financing 
whereas on the other hand they decrease the risk diversification ability of a company and in that 
way they reduce its investing options (Andreasen, Schindler & Valenzuela, 2017). According to 
the economic theory, capital controls may have dire consequences such as the decrease of capital 
supply, the raise of financing cost, the raise of financial regulations to domestic firms which do 
not have direct access to foreign capital markets (Blundell-Wignall & Roulet, 2014). Apparently, 
previous literature has focused on the effects of capital controls on financial markets. However, 
the aim of this paper is to assess how capital controls affect the aggregate economy, id est 
consumption and imports.   
One of the fundamental purposes of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) was to promote the 
abolishment of foreign exchange controls that delay the evolution of global trade. Maintaining 
capital controls was not considered against this objective as such regulations were assisting in the 
establishment of fixed exchange rates and were consecutively favoring trade (Tamirisa, 1999). 
The way that exchange and capital controls affect world trade is a function of how well 
structured and effective the controls are and how they interact with other regulating policies in 
the economy (Tamirisa, 1999). Exchange controls work as taxes on foreign currencies which are 
necessary for purchasing foreign goods and services and additionally they raise the domestic 
price of imports, thereafter they decrease trade. Furthermore, as Tamirisa (1999) refers, capital 
controls influence the trade of goods by reducing intertemporal trade and portfolio 
diversification. What is worth mentioning is that exchange and capital controls often increase 
transaction and other related to trade costs, resulting in the decline of trade (Tamirisa, 1999). It is 
noticeable that there is an important, yet ambiguous, connection of exchange and capital controls 
with trade, which makes the empirical evidence about it critical but also limited. Moreover, trade 
is reduced when the transfer of technology and managerial skills is limited due to foreign direct 
investment. Tamirisa (1999) also notes that capital controls frequently decrease business 
opportunities for hedging foreign exchange risks and financing trade, thus inhibiting trade. The 
terms of trade effect are not conspicuous and relate to the differences that occur in patterns of 
consumption and production levels of source and recipient countries. As a matter of fact, these 
effects are likely unimportant and they are usually compensated by capital flight and reduced 
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capital inflows due to capital controls, which can justify the limited empirical support of 
previous discussions (Tamirisa, 1999). 
This paper studies the effects of capital controls in Greece on per capita final consumption 
expenditure of households and on per capita imports of goods and services, using the synthetic 
control method. Synthetic control estimates the effect of an intervention in a panel data setting, 
where the outcome of interest is observed for one treated unit and several control units, for 
several periods before and after the intervention. This method addresses interventions which 
occur at a macroeconomic level, affecting aggregate entities such as countries; therefore the 
implementation of capital controls in Greece fits this description perfectly.   
Motivated by Abadie, Diamond & Hainmueller (2010), I describe a traditional synthetic control 
model which is based on the difference-in-differences framework with linear panel data, 
allowing the variation over time of the effects of unobserved variables on the outcome. The 
synthetic control method is applied twice to estimate the effects of the implementation of capital 
controls in Greece, in late June 2015, on both per capita final consumption expenditure of 
households and on per capita imports of goods and services. The findings show that for a short 
period after the implementation, the volume of consumption and imports decreases significantly 
in Greece, compared to the control group. Subsequently, they both recover and while 
consumption continues with an upward trend, imports do not experience the same. This short-
term negative effect of capital controls can be attributed to the limitations in cash withdrawals as 
well as to the exclusive cash circulation only inside the borders of the country. Furthermore, 
there is no apparent long-term effect of capital controls, since both variables recover after the 
sharp decline. 
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents the historical background 
of capital controls. In section 3, previous literature with focus on capital controls is examined. 
Section 4 describes the data and the sample used in the research. Section 5 describes the 
methodology and the model applied in the analysis, the results of which are mentioned in section 
6. Section 7 concludes. 
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2. Background 
Over the past, the financial crises were followed by capital control implementations. The first use 
was back in the World War I while capital controls were also used at the Bretton Woods system, 
which was founded after World War II (Tamirisa, 1999; Ghosh, Qureshi & Sugawara, 2014). In 
the Bretton Woods conference of 1944, where the International Monetary Fund was established, 
the basic connection between exchange and capital controls and international trade was defined 
(Tamirisa, 1999). One of the purposes of the IMF was to assist in the abolishment of foreign 
exchange regulations that slow up the development of global trade (Tamirisa, 1999). 
During the recent years, several experiments have been conducted with regulations on capital 
flows by applying a diversity of instruments, as described in Cardoso & Goldfajn (1997). More 
specifically, in the mid-1990s Venezuela’s response to capital outflows was to implement 
exchange controls to confine the current and capital account transactions. Furthermore, in early 
1996 Romania’s reaction to the payments crisis was to shut down the foreign exchange markets. 
At the same period, South Africa detained the cancellation of existing exchange controls on the 
capital outflows of its habitants. In the 1990s, Brazil increased the financial transaction tax to 
avert inflows and in late 1994 its reaction to peso crisis in Mexico was to prohibit the 
prepayment of foreign loans and to relax some of the capital inflow restrictions. Cardoso & 
Goldfajn (1997) cite last the case of Chile as it is generally considered successful. In particular, 
in mid-1990s Chile inserted a stamp duty, stretched the tax base to all foreign loans and set a 
one-year minimum maintenance period for foreign capital inflows. It is a case where capital 
controls were successful in changing the synthesis of inflows to liabilities, according to Ostry et 
al. (2010), who mainly emphasize the effectiveness of controls in economies with complete 
systems of regulations in most types of flows. 
In our days there are modern situations of capital controls in Malaysia, Iceland, Cyprus and 
lately in Greece, where the case is rather different. While in the aforementioned countries what 
caused the necessity of capital controls implementation was the financial crisis itself, in Greece 
the financial crisis that yielded the capital controls was a result of a chronic fiscal and political 
crisis (Samitas & Polyzos, 2016). 
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3. Literature Review 
Hitherto literature has focused on the effects of restrictions on capital inflows and capital 
outflows and has yielded mixed results. Hence, there have been many times where, due to these 
controversial effects, researchers participated in debates in order to clarify the most 
representative answer. 
Several researchers focused on capital controls and their connection to the stock market. More 
specifically, Buss (2013) wanted to estimate the effect of capital controls to exchange rates and 
to the volatility of stock market as well as the unfavorable consequences of their implementation 
on foreign exchange and on the welfare of the economy. He provided evidence that the use of 
transaction taxes on capital inflows has vague impact on the financial stability. According to 
Andreasen, Schindler & Valenzuela (2017) the majority of empirical research regarding capital 
controls is focused on stock markets. They show that limitations in capital inflows generate an 
important rise in corporate bond spreads and that the effect of such restrictions is quite notable in 
more financially restricted firms. Also, when the bonds are issued by bigger companies or by 
those activating in specific economies, then the spreads are less vulnerable to controls on capital 
inflows. This impact is enlarged in periods of financial distress and market illiquidity. 
Andreasen, Schindler & Valenzuela (2017) are considered the first that use bond-level data to 
examine the effect of capital controls on corporate credit spreads. They show that capital controls 
have an important impact on the cost of international debt capital for firms, different for the 
various types of limitations.     
Giovannini & Park (1989) examined the effects of forbidding the households from trading assets 
internationally. The difference there was that regulations were imposed on the volume of 
financial transactions that happened with the subsidy of foreign trade, while until then the 
restrictions were on taxes on international interest payments, on stocks of foreign assets or on 
taxes on acquisitions of foreign kinds of payments. Their findings showed that the companies 
transfer the falsifications from financial markets to goods markets, and they are associated to the 
strength of capital controls. More specifically, when there are stricter controls on trade then the 
financial expansion has bigger impact on the interest rates of a country. 
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Blundell-Wignall & Roulet (2014) compare pre-crisis periods and crisis periods. More 
specifically, they show that controls on capital inflows, especially in debt liabilities, are very 
useful in good times when emerging markets are characterized by strong inflows and there is 
strong upward pressure towards the exchange rates. Contrariwise, within the period of the crisis 
less tight restrictions on inflows result in better growth. According to Blundell-Wignall & Roulet 
(2014), a significant part of the microeconomic literature illustrates that when emerging 
countries introduce capital controls, they benefit from the positive impact which is predicted by 
the economic theory. Nevertheless, the indications in the macroeconomic literature are vague.  
Blundell-Wignall & Roulet (2014) cite that countries that are in favor of capital controls are the 
ones that want to avoid exchange rate appreciation with the purpose to support trade. Their 
findings showed no support for capital controls and that the positive impact was in the period 
before the crisis, while in the crisis period the impact was negative. Furthermore, in the pre-crisis 
periods characterized by strong inflows and high risk for exchange rate appreciation, introducing 
regulations on inflows in order to halt this appreciation creates strong trade advantages. 
In the greatest part of empirical research there is no distinction between regulations on inflows 
and regulations on outflows. Magud, Reinhart & Rogoff (2011) separate these two types of 
controls while they also state that literature so far faces four very serious problems that make it 
difficult to make comparisons between empirical and theoretical research: i) there is no united 
theoretical frame that contributes to the analysis of macroeconomic consequences of controls, ii) 
there is heterogeneity in countries with capital controls and in the time when they were 
introduced, iii) there can be many reasons for capital controls to be successful and iv) there is no 
common methodology in the empirical research and previous studies have been influenced by 
countries that used capital controls in the past. Their findings are based on the distinction 
mentioned before. More specifically, regulations on capital inflows render the monetary policy 
more independent, they change the composition of capital flows and they restrict the exchange 
rates pressures. On the other hand, regulations on capital outflows reduce the outflows and 
potentially provide space for autonomous monetary policy, as in the case of Malaysia. Apart 
from that, there is little evidence for effective regulations on outflows, according to Magud, 
Reinhart & Rogoff (2011). 
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Cardoso & Goldfajn (1997) refer among others to the duration of usage of capital controls. They 
support that the government reacts intensively to capital flows by increasing restrictions on 
inflows during “booms” and reducing them in periods of financial distress. They believe that 
capital controls are effective in the short-run (six months) in changing the levels and the 
composition of capital flows but they do not have constant long-term impact. Cardoso & 
Goldfajn (1997) also claim that the role of capital flows is controversial, since they 
simultaneously increase development and create macroeconomic instability. They also state that 
capital flows affect consumption, production and macroeconomic management, and especially 
capital inflows offer the benefit of smoothing the consumption, a procedure that takes place 
when there are cyclical distortions and where there is growth promoted by foreign savings. Their 
findings show that capital controls are effective in the short-run, without having long-run impact 
and that regulations decrease flows and alter their composition away from debt and equity in the 
short-run. 
Ostry et al. (2010) reached to a key conclusion that if the economy is operating near potential, if 
the amount of reserves is adequate and if the exchange rate is not undervalued, then the use of 
capital controls is an important policy instrument to regulate inflows, along with the use of 
prudential and macroeconomic policies. Despite the fact that capital flows in emerging countries 
are common, as they contribute to lower-cost financing and make the market appear confident, 
the sudden surges can affect macroeconomic management and create financial risks. Ostry et al. 
(2010) also state that these large capital inflows drive to the exchange rate appreciation and 
sabotage the advantage of the tradable sector, and moreover they may lead to excess foreign 
borrowing and foreign currency exposure. As mentioned before for Magud, Reinhart & Rogoff 
(2011), likewise Ostry et al. (2010) refer that there is empirical evidence that shows the impact of 
capital controls on monetary policy autonomy and on the composition of inflows, by elongating 
their maturity. Ostry et al. (2010) conclude that for prudential and macroeconomic reasons, there 
are cases where capital controls are legal policy components, as a way to manage the capital 
inflow surges.  
Tamirisa (1999) examines the exchange and capital controls and their impact on trade. Bilateral 
exports depend on the distance among the participating countries, on the size and wealth of a 
country, on the tariffs and on exchange and capital controls. A liberal capital account in a 
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country can promote trade significantly. Until then, there was not much empirical evidence on 
the effects of exchange and capital controls on trade. According to Tamirisa (1999) the greatest 
part of recent studies used the black market premium to calculate the magnitude of exchange and 
capital controls and showed that they tend to reduce trade, although the black market premium is 
a deficient measurement as it can be biased and cannot yield reliable results. The findings of 
Tamirisa (1999) show that exchange and capital controls are a significant impediment to trade 
and especially to exports into developing countries, but not into industrial ones. It varies 
according to the level of development of the country and on the type of imposed exchange and 
capital controls. Exchange controls, consisted of regulations on current payments and transfers, 
are a small barrier to trade while capital controls confine bilateral trade for the developing 
countries and not for the industrial. Tamirisa (1999) emphasizes that these findings reflect the 
difference in the range of liberalization across countries and the types of restrictions: exchange 
controls have been completely cancelled worldwide whereas capital controls keep prevailing in 
many developing economies and not in industrial ones.  
Samitas & Polyzos (2016) focused on the appropriate time of implementation of capital controls. 
Their findings illustrate that when restrictions to capital flows are implemented early, there can 
be less impact from these controls to the banking system and to the economy as a whole. They 
underline the dire consequences of capital controls on the financial system and present how these 
negative effects are transmitted to the real economy via a reduction in corporate investment, 
creating a total production loss. Samitas & Polyzos (2016) stress that even if adopting such 
controls early reduces the negative effects, the government should reconsider about introducing 
capital controls when there is a banking crisis occurring. The authors also suggest that policy 
makers focus on designing other policy tools as a first solution and do not introduce capital 
controls unless it is the last option.     
According to Ghosh, Qureshi & Sugawara (2014) the majority of previous studies has examined 
the policy options for managing capital flows on the recipient countries; however, there are some 
recent papers that conducted a more coordinated research in managing flows by acting “at both 
ends”, the source and the recipient countries. The idea of regulating short-term flows “at both 
ends” to reduce capital flow volatility has been introduced in the Bretton Woods system by its 
main founders, John Maynard Keynes and Harry Dexter White, in their attempt to regulate the 
 
10 
 
international monetary system after the World War II. The findings of Ghosh, Qureshi & 
Sugawara (2014) show that restrictions “at both ends” can affect the quantity of cross-border 
capital flows. Regarding the source country, controls on capital outflows are related to smaller 
flows whereas for the recipient country, controls on capital inflows are related to smaller inflows. 
The authors also conclude that while the impact of simultaneous restrictions on inflows or 
outflows may not be additive, actions “at both ends” can create a bigger decrease in the quantity 
of flows or an equal decrease, though with less strict controls, at either end. 
To my knowledge, while there are several papers that focus on the effects of capital controls on 
real economy and GDP, only a few deal with their impact on consumption and imports. 
Therefore, my purpose is to further examine this impact in Greece, as it is a very recent case with 
global repercussion. 
 
4. Data and Sample 
This study consists of panel data in quarterly country-level macroeconomic variables from the 
first quarter of 2010 until the fourth quarter of 2016. I collected the data from the database of 
Eurostat, as it is an ideal source for macroeconomic data in aggregate level. The data is retrieved 
in chain linked volumes of 2010, which implies that it is in real prices without the effects of 
inflation or deflation, and it is seasonally and calendar adjusted. Subsequently, I converted these 
volumes to per capita amounts, in order to have a more representative comparison between the 
countries.  
The year 2008, when the global financial crisis started, was deliberately excluded from the 
sample. Hence, the sample period starts in 2010 so that all the effects of the crisis would be 
attenuated. The capital controls were implemented in Greece in late June, 2015 so the treated 
unit is Greece and the intervention of interest takes place in the second quarter of 2015. The pre-
intervention data consists of five and a half years and the post-intervention data consists of one 
and a half year. The sample period ends in 2016 when the most recent data was available for. 
The macroeconomic variables I decided to include in this study, and to examine if there is an 
impact on them resulting from the implementation of capital controls in Greece, are per capita 
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final consumption expenditure of households and per capita imports of goods and services. Since 
capital controls in Greece restricted cash withdrawals and excluded cash circulation outside the 
country, a negative impact on individual consumption expenditure and on imports is expected as 
a result of this paper. Consumption is not that common in previous literature whereas imports, 
usually included in the term of trade along with exports, have been the subject of several papers 
concerning the effects of capital controls. It is necessary to mention here that one more variable 
is used as auxiliary, per capita exports of goods and services.   
The countries I selected as the comparison group are, with alphabetical order, Austria, Belgium, 
Finland, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Lithuania, Portugal and Spain. First of all, the control group 
needs to be unaffected by the event of interest. To my knowledge, none of the nine countries of 
the control group had imposed capital controls similar to Greece’s for the period 2010-2016. 
However, there are different types of controls with different uses which make it difficult for a 
researcher to be confident for its selection. Second, the comparison group needs to have relevant 
characteristics with the treated unit. I selected Portugal, Italy, Ireland and Spain as, along with 
Greece (PIIGS), they were similarly affected by the global financial crisis. The rest of the 
countries may not be that similar to Greece, however the methodology applied in this paper 
ensures that the comparison group is as similar as possible. As Abadie, Diamond & Hainmueller 
(2010) state, it is not easy to find unaffected units with very similar characteristics to those of the 
unit affected by the intervention of interest.  
 
5. Methodology and model 
Synthetic control method 
Researchers are often eager to examine the effects of several events or policy interventions that 
happen at an aggregate level and influence aggregate entities, such as firms, organizations, or 
geographic areas such as countries and cities (Abadie, Diamond & Hainmueller, 2010). In order 
to assess the impact of these events they use comparative case studies, where they “estimate the 
evolution of aggregate outcomes for a unit affected by a particular occurrence of the event or 
intervention of interest and compare it to the evolution of the same aggregates estimated for 
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some control group of unaffected units” (Abadie, Diamond & Hainmueller, 2010, p. 493). Here, 
the unit affected by the specific event of interest - the implementation of capital controls – is 
Greece, whereas the control group refers to the rest nine countries. The aggregate outcome 
variables of interest refer to per capita final consumption expenditure of households and per 
capita imports of goods and services, hereinafter cited often as consumption and imports, 
respectively.  
The only requirement for the comparison of the evolution of an aggregate outcome between 
exposed and unexposed units to the intervention of interest is the aggregate data, which is often 
easily accessible (Abadie, Diamond & Hainmueller, 2010). Due to the fact that policy 
interventions and events of interest occur at an aggregate level and that there is available macro 
and aggregate data, research applying comparative case studies has a big potential. Nevertheless, 
according to Abadie, Diamond & Hainmueller (2010), comparative case study research 
encounters two issues that restrict its use in social sciences and influence its empirical 
application: i) in comparative case studies there is ambiguity in the way comparison groups are 
selected; they are chosen based on subjective reasons of researchers regarding the relationship 
between treated and untreated units, ii) comparative case studies contain an uncertainty 
concerning the aggregate values of the variables in the sample. However, this does not mean that 
the effect of the event of interest can be estimated without errors. Abadie, Diamond & 
Hainmueller (2010) emphasize that even with aggregate data, it is uncertain whether there is a 
potential of extracting accurate information from the control group about the counterfactual 
outcome orbit of the treated unit, assuming the intervention never occurred. 
The main idea of synthetic control is that a combination of units usually creates a more 
representative comparison for the exposed unit than any single unit by itself. Compared to 
traditional regression methods, the synthetic control method has two advantages, the 
transparency and the safety against extrapolation (Abadie, Diamond & Hainmueller, 2010). 
Given that a synthetic control is the weighted average of the existing control units, the method 
clarifies how each control unit contributes to the counterfactual outcome of interest and the 
extent of similarity between the treated unit and the control group. These weights should be 
nonnegative and sum to one, providing safety against extrapolation (Abadie, Diamond & 
Hainmueller, 2010). 
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Robbins, Saunders & Kilmer (2015) stress the extensive use of synthetic control methods as tool 
for analysis of economic programs given that the analyst can obtain a complete perspective of 
the effect of the intervention by comparing the exposed units to their respective synthetic control. 
The main form of synthetic control methods includes a single treated unit with multiple untreated 
units for comparison; all the units have been measured across different time periods before and 
after the treatment (Robbins, Saunders & Kilmer, 2015). Sometimes, the scarcity of data can 
impede efforts to i) create a comparison group that matches the exposed unit, ii) estimate the 
effect of the intervention with precision, iii) calculate how statistically significant is the effect 
and iv) embody the multiple outcome variables of interest (Robbins, Saunders & Kilmer, 2015). 
Synthetic control is based on the setting of a conventional difference-in-differences model but 
has two different properties: i) it allows for time-varying individual-specific heterogeneity and ii) 
it takes a data driven approach to select the control group and form the counterfactual (Sovich, 
2016). A difference-in-differences model holds, if it is assumed that the treated and untreated 
units follow similar factor models before the intervention and furthermore, that they do not 
undergo differential shocks after the intervention, although a structural break occurring in both 
groups is allowed (Sovich, 2016). Synthetic control maintains these assumptions and forms a 
control group less subjectively, and also it has several advantages over a difference-in difference 
model: i) it creates graphs that depict how the Average Treatment on the Treated (ATT) varies 
over time and analyzes how much the controls resemble in the pre-intervention period, ii) it is 
efficient even when the exposed unit is only one and iii) it can calculate a separate ATT for every 
affected observation (Sovich, 2016). However, the synthetic control method has three 
disadvantages: i) its estimators cannot conduct large scale (asymptotic) inference; it uses 
permutation methods to calculate standard errors, instead, ii) there is no clear identifying 
assumption and iii) it needs more time than the difference-in difference model to perform 
calculations (Sovich, 2016). 
Inspired by the publication Abadie, Diamond & Hainmueller (2010), I describe a conventional 
model of the synthetic control approach. This model is based on the difference-in-differences 
framework with linear panel data, which allows the variation over time of the effects of 
unobserved variables on the outcome. I use the synthetic control method twice to examine the 
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effects of the implementation of capital controls in Greece, in late June 2015, on both 
consumption and imports.  
The following model is based on Abadie, Diamond & Hainmueller (2010) and considers a single 
treated unit with multiple controls. Suppose we observe J+1 countries for t = 1, …T periods and 
that, “without loss of generality”, the first country, Greece, is affected by the event of interest, 
whereas countries {2, … J+1} are the potential controls. An intervention happens at period T0 + 
1, 1 < T0 + 1 < T, which in this case is the implementation of capital controls, and it only affects 
country one (Greece) and leaves the remaining J countries unaffected. To make notation simpler 
and again, as stated in Abadie, Diamond & Hainmueller (2010), “without loss of generality” 
assume that the first country is treated without interruption after some initial treatment period. 
The purpose is to measure the effect of the intervention on the treated country, id est the effect of 
capital controls implementation on Greece. 
Let 𝑌𝑖𝑡
𝑁≡ outcome that would be observed for country i at time t in the absence of intervention, 
for countries i = 1, ..., J + 1 and time periods t = 1, …, T. Let T0 ≡ number of periods before the 
intervention, 1 ≤ T0 < T. Let 𝑌𝑖𝑡
𝐼  ≡ outcome that would be observed for country i at time t if 
country i is exposed to the event in periods T0 + 1 to T. In accordance with Abadie, Diamond & 
Hainmueller (2010), we assume that the intervention has no impact on the outcome before the 
implementation period, therefore we have 𝑌𝑖𝑡
𝐼  = 𝑌𝑖𝑡
𝑁 for t < T0 + 1 and all i ∈ {1, …, N}. In the 
cases where interventions have an effect before their implementation, through anticipation 
effects, then we just redefine T0 to the first period in which the outcome may possibly react to the 
treatment. In the notation it is also implied the common assumption that units do not interfere 
with each other, meaning that we assume that the intervention only affects the treated unit while 
the outcomes of the untreated units remain unaffected.  
Consecutively, as Abadie, Diamond & Hainmueller (2010) suggest, let αit = 𝑌𝑖𝑡
𝐼  - 𝑌𝑖𝑡
𝑁 be the effect 
of the treatment on unit i at time t, and let Dit be an indicator (dummy variable) with value one if 
unit i is treated at time t and zero otherwise. At time t, the observed outcome for unit i is 
Yit = 𝑌𝑖𝑡
𝑁 + αitDit . 
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Given that only country “one” is affected by the intervention and only after period T0, with 1 ≤ 
T0 < T, we have 
Dit = {
 1     if 𝑖 = 1 and 𝑡 > 𝑇0,
 0     otherwise.               
    
We want to estimate the effect of intervention over time for the treated unit 
α1 = (𝑎1𝑇0+1 , … , α1T), 
where for t > T0 : 
α1t = 𝑌1𝑡
𝐼  - 𝑌1𝑡
𝑁 = Y1t - 𝑌1𝑡
𝑁 . 
Given that 𝑌1𝑡
𝐼  is observed, we need to estimate 𝑌1𝑡
𝑁 in order to estimate α1t . Therefore, we only 
need to construct the unobserved counterfactual. Assume that 𝑌𝑖𝑡
𝑁 follows a factor model for all i: 
                                                              𝑌𝑖𝑡
𝑁 = δt + θtZi + λtμi + εit ,                                        
(1) 
where δt represents an unobserved common factor with constant factor loadings across units, Zi is 
a (r × 1) vector of observed covariates unaffected by the intervention, θt is a (1 × r) vector of 
loadings (unknown parameters), λt is a (1 × F) vector of common unobserved factors, μi is an (F 
× 1) vector of unknown factor loadings, and εit are zero mean unobserved transitory shocks at the 
country level. 
Always in accordance with Abadie, Diamond & Hainmueller (2010), consider a (J × 1) vector of 
weights W = (w2, …, wJ+1)’ with wj ≥ 0 for j = 2, …, J + 1 and w2 + … + wJ+1 = 1. The idea is 
that each value of the vector W represents a potential synthetic control, which is a specific 
weighted average of control countries. For each synthetic control W, the value of the outcome 
variable is 
∑ 𝑤𝑗𝑌𝑗𝑡
𝐽+1
𝑗=2
= 𝛿𝑡 + 𝜃𝑡 ∑ 𝑤𝑗𝑍𝑗
𝐽+1
𝑗=2
+ 𝜆𝑡  ∑ 𝑤𝑗𝜇𝑗
𝐽+1
𝑗=2
+  ∑ 𝑤𝑗𝜀𝑗𝑡 .
𝐽+1
𝑗=2
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Suppose that there are (𝑤2
∗, …, 𝑤𝐽+1
∗ ) such that the synthetic control matches the treated unit in 
the pre-intervention period 
∑ 𝑤𝑗
∗𝑌𝑗1
𝐽+1
𝑗=2
=  𝑌11 , ∑ 𝑤𝑗
∗𝑌𝑗2
𝐽+1
𝑗=2
=  𝑌12  , . . . . .,
∑ 𝑤𝑗
∗𝑌𝑗𝑇o
𝐽+1
𝑗=2
=  𝑌1𝑇o ,   𝑎𝑛𝑑 ∑ 𝑤𝑗
∗𝑍𝑗
𝐽+1
𝑗=2
=  𝑍1 .     (2)   
 
In Appendix B of Abadie, Diamond & Hainmueller (2010) it is proven that if ∑ 𝜆𝑡
′ 𝜆𝑡
𝑇0
𝑡=1  is non-
singular, then for all t > T0 we have 
𝑌1𝑡
𝑁 − ∑ 𝑤𝑗
∗𝑌𝑗𝑡
𝐽+1
𝑗=2
=  ∑ 𝑤𝑗
∗
𝐽+1
𝑗=2
 ∑ λ𝑡
𝑇0
𝑠=1
 (∑ λ𝑛
′ λ𝑛
𝑇0
𝑛=1
)
−1
 λ𝑠
′  (𝜀𝑗𝑠 −  𝜀1𝑠) −  ∑ 𝑤𝑗
∗
𝐽+1
𝑗=2
(𝜀𝑗𝑡 −  𝜀1𝑡).      (3) 
We have 
E [∑ 𝑤𝑗
∗
𝐽+1
𝑗=2
 ∑ λ𝑡
𝑇0
𝑠=1
 (∑ λ𝑛
′ λ𝑛
𝑇0
𝑛=1
)
−1
 λ𝑠
′  (𝜀𝑗𝑠 −  𝜀1𝑠) −  ∑ 𝑤𝑗
∗
𝐽+1
𝑗=2
(𝜀𝑗𝑡 −  𝜀1𝑡)] →  0 
as T0 → ∞ or if the number of pre-treatment periods T0 is large relative to the transitory shocks 
εit. Then we can use 
?̂?1𝑡  = 𝑌1𝑡  −  ∑ 𝑤𝑗
∗𝑌𝑗𝑡
𝐽+1
𝑗=2
 =  𝑌1𝑡 −  𝑌𝑊∗𝑡 
for T0 + 1 < t < T ,  as an approximately unbiased estimator of α1t , which represents the 
difference between the observed outcome and the synthetic control. 
Note that equation (2) can only hold if (Y11 , …, 𝑌1𝑇0 , Z1
′ ) belongs to the convex area of {(Y21, 
…, 𝑌2𝑇0, Z2
′ ), …, (YJ+11, …, 𝑌𝐽+1𝑇0 , Z𝐽+1
′ )}. As a matter of fact, it is common that there is no 
such set of weights that can make equation (2) fit precisely the data. Subsequently, the synthetic 
 
17 
 
control is chosen so that equation (2) can fit approximately the data. Sometimes it is not feasible 
to get a weighted combination of unaffected units and thus, equation (3) may approximately 
hold. This can happen if (Y11 , …, 𝑌1𝑇0 , Z1
′ ) does not belong in the convex area of {(Y21, …, 
𝑌2𝑇0, Z2
′ ), …, (YJ+11, …, 𝑌𝐽+1𝑇0 , Z𝐽+1
′ )}. 
As suggested by Abadie, Diamond & Hainmueller (2010), even in the case where synthetic 
control matches sufficiently the exposed unit, there can be large interpolation biases if the 
aforementioned simple linear model does not hold for the entire set of countries in any possible 
sample. A solution in order to limit such biases due to comparison of countries with different 
characteristics is to include in the comparison group only countries with similar characteristics to 
those of the country affected by the event of interest. This justifies why I decided to include the 
PII(G)S countries in the comparison group. 
In order to proceed with the estimations, I used the software STATA to perform the synthetic 
control method twice. In the first application, the outcome variable of interest is per capita final 
consumption expenditure of households and the predictor is per capita imports of goods and 
services, whereas in the second application, the respective variables are per capita imports of 
goods and services and per capita exports of goods and services. Both applications construct a 
synthetic Greece that reflects the values of predictors before the implementation of capital 
controls in Greece. The effect of capital controls on consumption and imports is estimated as the 
difference between Greece and its synthetic versions on both macroeconomic variables, after the 
implementation of capital controls. 
 
6. Results 
Graphs 1 and 2 depict the trends in Greece and the rest of the examined countries in per capita 
final consumption expenditure of households and per capita imports of goods and services, 
respectively. As it can be noticed in these graphs, the selected rest of the countries may not 
provide an appropriate comparison group for Greece in order to examine the effects of capital 
controls implementation on consumption and imports.  
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In graph 1 it can be seen that in the beginning of 2010, the level of consumption in Greece is 
higher than the respective figure of the rest of the countries until they converge and cross 
approximately in the middle of 2010. Subsequently, Greece follows a decreasing trend until the 
end of 2012 when it starts slightly to increase up to the middle of 2015 when the capital controls 
are implemented. The respective figure for the rest of the countries in the beginning of 2010 it 
slightly increases until it reaches the end of 2011 when it starts to fall until the beginning of 2013 
when it starts a slight upward trend until the occurrence of the event of interest. Following the 
implementation of capital controls, the level of consumption for the rest of the countries 
continues to rise while the respective figure for Greece presents a remarkable drop for 
approximately three months and consecutively shows a significant increase for another 3 months 
until the beginning of 2016 when it follows a slightly upward trend.     
Graph 1. Trends in per capita final consumption expenditure of households: Greece vs. the rest 
of the countries 
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In graph 2 it is obvious that the level of imports in Greece and the rest of the countries differ 
remarkably even before the implementation of capital controls. The level of imports of Greece 
fluctuates around 1500 euros per person for the period before the intervention whereas the 
respective figure for the rest of the countries starts slightly above 3000 euros per person in the 
beginning of 2010 and increases to approximately 4000 euros per person right before the event 
of interest. Following the implementation of capital controls, the level of imports for Greece 
shows a significant decline for the next 3 months, and then it recovers and slightly stabilizes, 
whereas the respective figure for the rest of the countries fluctuates followed by a notable 
upward trend. 
Graph 2. Trends in per capita imports of goods and services: Greece vs. the rest of the countries 
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Synthetic Control Method – Outcome Variable: Consumption 
As mentioned earlier, the construction of synthetic Greece mirrors the convex combination of the 
rest of the countries that show the closest resemblance to Greece in terms of imports (Abadie, 
Diamond & Hainmueller, 2010). Table 1 compares the pre-intervention characteristics of actual 
and synthetic Greece, along with the average of the rest nine countries. 
Table 1. Predictor Balance for consumption 
 Greece Average of 9 
control 
countries 
Predictor Treated Synthetic 
Imports of goods 
and services (per 
capita) 
1390.935 1505.515 3558.155 
 
We observe that the average of the nine countries does not seem to account for a suitable control 
group for Greece. More specifically, before the implementation of capital controls the average 
per capita imports is substantially higher in the average of the nine countries than in Greece. On 
the contrary, the synthetic Greece approximates the level of the predictor which Greece had 
before the implementation of capital controls.  
According to Abadie, Diamond & Hainmueller (2010), the results on this table emphasize an 
important property of the estimators in synthetic control method. In particular, the synthetic 
control method reveals the relation between Greece and its synthetic counterpart, which consists 
of the weighted average of the rest nine countries. Thus, the synthetic control method prevents 
the estimation of counterfactuals that do not belong in the convex area, as mentioned in previous 
section.  
Table 2 shows the weights of the control countries that constitute the synthetic Greece. It can be 
observed that Spain is the country that can reproduce Greece better, as it is assigned weight one 
while the remaining countries are assigned zero weight. 
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Table 2. Country weights in the synthetic Greece 
Country Weight 
Austria 0 
Belgium 0 
Finland 0 
Hungary 0 
Ireland 0 
Italy 0 
Lithuania 0 
Portugal 0 
Spain 1 
 
 
Graph 3. Trends in per capita final consumption expenditure of households: Greece vs. synthetic 
Greece 
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Graph 3 shows per capita final consumption expenditure of households for Greece and its 
synthetic counterpart for the period 2010-2016. It can be noticed that, compared to the level of 
consumption in the rest of the countries, as illustrated in graph 1, the level of consumption in the 
synthetic Greece approximates more the trajectory of the respective figure in Greece for the 
pretreatment period. 
The estimation of the effect of the implementation of capital controls on per capita final 
consumption expenditure of households is based on the difference between per capita imports of 
goods and services in Greece and in its synthetic version subsequent to the treatment. It can be 
noticed that for a short period after the event, the two lines follow a different trend. While 
consumption in the synthetic Greece continues its upward trend, the actual Greece experiences a 
sharp drop for a short period after the intervention and then it rapidly recovers and reaches a 
steady state with a slightly upward trend. As Abadie, Diamond & Hainmueller (2010) state, this 
discrepancy suggests that in the short-run, there is a negative impact of the implementation of 
capital controls on per capita final consumption expenditure of households, as expected. This can 
be attributed to the limitations in cash withdrawals due to which private savings cannot be used 
as one wishes. Apparently, citizens needed some time to get accustomed to the new conditions 
and, for the elderly, to learn how to use plastic money. As soon as they accomplished that and, 
along with the loosening of cash withdrawal limitations, consumption recovered and reached its 
pre-intervention levels. These findings are in accordance with those of Cardoso & Goldfajn 
(1997), who showed that capital flows affect consumption and that capital controls are effective 
in the short-run, without having long-run impact.       
 
Synthetic Control Method – Outcome Variable: Imports 
The purpose, again, is to construct a synthetic Greece that reflects the convex combination of the 
rest of the countries that approximates Greece the most, in terms of per capita exports of goods 
and services, as Abadie, Diamond & Hainmueller, (2010) state. Table 3 compares the 
characteristics of actual Greece with those of the synthetic Greece, as well as with the average of 
the rest countries, in the pretreatment period. 
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It can be noticed that the average of the nine control countries does not reflect an appropriate 
control group for Greece. Particularly, in the pretreatment period, the average per capita exports 
is notably higher for the average of nine countries than for Greece. Contrariwise, the synthetic 
Greece approaches the level of the predictor that Greece had in the period before capital controls. 
 
Table 3. Predictor Balance for imports 
 Greece Average of 9 
control 
countries 
Predictor Treated Synthetic 
Exports of goods 
and services (per 
capita) 
1177.568 1444.189 3829.002 
 
 
Table 4. Country weights in the synthetic Greece 
Country Weight 
Austria 0 
Belgium 0 
Finland 0 
Hungary 0 
Ireland 0 
Italy 0 
Lithuania 0 
Portugal 1 
Spain 0 
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Table 4 shows the weights of the control countries that constitute the synthetic Greece. We can 
observe that the country that best reproduces Greece is Portugal, since it is assigned weight one 
whereas the other countries are assigned zero weight. 
Graph 4 illustrates per capita imports of goods and services for Greece and its synthetic 
counterpart for the period 2010-2016. It is obvious that, in comparison with the level of imports 
in the rest of the countries, as shown in graph 2, the level of imports in the synthetic Greece 
resembles more the trajectory of the respective figure in Greece for the pre-intervention period. 
 
Graph 4. Trends in per capita imports of goods and services: Greece vs. synthetic Greece 
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period after the event, the two lines follow a different trend. Imports in the synthetic Greece 
experience a slight decline right after the event and consecutively follow an upward trend, 
whereas in the real Greece the respective figure plummets, followed by a recovery. However, the 
upward trend does not persist, even as imports in the synthetic Greece continue to increase. The 
difference suggests that in the short-run there is a negative effect of capital controls on per capita 
imports of goods and services, as expected. This can be attributed to the exclusive cash 
circulation inside the borders of Greece, as well as to cash withdrawal limitations. Exporting 
countries are not guaranteed their payments and therefore they do not ship their products. 
Additionally, individuals cannot have access to their full amount of savings; thus remittances are 
not considered a payment method anymore.       
 
7. Conclusion 
Over the past, several financial crises have occurred due to unstable monetary systems or 
precedent political crises. Emerging economies, in their attempt to recover from the recession, 
attract foreign capital in surges. However, such volume of capital flows can cause undesirable 
results; therefore it is necessary to regulate them. Among macroeconomic policies and prudential 
measures, there is a policy tool imposed by many countries under such circumstances, the capital 
controls. The implementation of capital controls, along with the expected results, can have 
further impact. 
Previous literature has studied the effects of capital controls on many fields. Extensive research 
has been conducted on their impact on the stock market, on exchange and interest rates, on trade, 
on monetary policy, on GDP et cetera. These studies yield ambiguous results since the effects of 
capital controls are controversial, and researchers resort to debates in order to solve their 
discrepancies. Whereas the majority of previous studies focuses on financial markets, this paper 
examines the effects of capital controls on aggregate economy and, particularly, on consumption 
and imports. 
The method applied in the analysis is the synthetic control, which is built upon the standard 
difference-in-differences model, however with several alternative properties. Synthetic control 
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assumes an event of interest and the periods before and after that. It assumes a unit affected by 
the intervention of interest and others not affected. Synthetic control method matches the 
characteristics, in terms of predictors, of the unaffected units with those of the affected before the 
intervention and constructs a counterfactual that represents the trajectory of the treated unit in the 
absence of the event of interest. This paper uses Greece as the unit affected by the event of 
interest, capital controls, and nine more countries as the unaffected, also known as control group. 
The dataset consists of the quarterly-level macroeconomic variables, per capita final 
consumption expenditure of households, per capita imports of goods and services and per capita 
exports of goods and services, of the 10 countries for the period 2010-2016. Synthetic control is 
applied twice, with different outcome variables and predictors each time. 
In the first application, the outcome variable of interest is consumption, while imports act as the 
predictor. Synthetic control matches the characteristics of the control group, in terms of imports, 
with those of Greece before the capital controls and constructs the synthetic Greece, which 
represents the trends of consumption in Greece if capital controls were not implemented. The 
findings show that while consumption in the synthetic Greece continues its upward trend, in real 
Greece the respective figure experiences a sharp decline for a short period after the intervention 
and then it recovers and reaches a steady state with a slightly upward trend. This short-term 
negative effect of capital controls on consumption can be attributed to limitations in cash 
withdrawals which deter citizens from using their cash or, generally, to the new conditions to 
which people need to adjust. Therefore, as soon as citizens adjust to changes, there is no long-
term impact of capital controls on consumption, as the figure maintains its pre-intervention trend 
once it recovers. 
In the second application of synthetic control method, the outcome variable of interest is imports, 
and exports act as the predictor. The characteristics of the control group are matched, this time in 
terms of exports, with those of Greece before the implementation of capital controls. Synthetic 
control constructs the synthetic Greece, which represents the trends of imports in Greece in the 
absence of capital controls. The findings show that imports in the synthetic Greece experience a 
slight fall right after the intervention and then follow an upward trend, while in the actual Greece 
the respective figure plummets and subsequently recovers. However, even in the synthetic 
Greece imports continue to increase, in the real Greece the upward trend does not continue. 
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There is a short-term negative impact of capital controls on imports that can be attributed to the 
restricted circulation of cash only inside the borders of Greece, as well as to cash withdrawal 
limitations. Moreover, there is no obvious long-term effect of capital controls on imports, as they 
recover from the sharp decline. Their trend in the years before the intervention is not stable as 
they experience many fluctuations. After the recovery, the figure continues to variate. 
It is worth mentioning that the decrease of consumption can cause a surplus in some products, 
which can automatically lead to a drop in imports of such products. On the other hand, limited 
imports can decrease the consumption, since there will be no sufficient products in the markets. 
Therefore, the impact of capital controls can be amplified as in real economy the macroeconomic 
variables are interdependent. In the early days of implementation, citizens were against capital 
controls as these measures coerced them to change their consuming habits. However, this impact 
is not permanent as, according to the findings, the macroeconomic variables manage to recover. 
As a matter of fact, no one can be sure that there will not be any further impact in the future. 
Since capital controls are still in use, though less strict, they keep affecting the real economy of 
Greece.   
As an extension of this study, more predictors can be used and, in fact, complementary to the 
outcome variables of interest, as suggested by Abadie, Diamond & Hainmueller (2010). 
Therefore, this can be the base for further examination. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
28 
 
References 
Abadie, A., Diamond, A. & Hainmueller, J. (2010). Synthetic Control Methods for Comparative 
Case Studies: Estimating the Effect of California’s Tobacco Control Program, Journal of the 
American Statistical Association, [e-journal] vol. 105, no. 490, pp.493–505, Available 
Online: http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1198/jasa.2009.ap08746. 
Andreasen, E., Schindler, M. & Valenzuela, P. (2017). Capital Controls and the Cost of Debt, 
Working Paper of the International Monetary Fund, no. 135. 
Blundell-Wignall, A. & Roulet, C. (2014). Capital Controls on Inflows , the Global Financial 
Crisis and Economic Growth: Evidence for Emerging Economies, OECD Journal: Financial 
Market Trends, vol. 2013/2, pp.29–43. 
Buss, A. (2013). Capital Controls And International Financial Stability A Dynamic General 
Equilibrium Analysis In Incomplete Markets, Working paper of the European Central Bank 
no. 1578. 
Cardoso, E. & Goldfajn, I. (1997). Capital Flows to Brazil: The Endogeneity of Capital Controls, 
Working Paper of the International Monetary Fund, no. 115. 
Ghosh, A. R., Qureshi, M. S. & Sugawara, N. (2014). Regulating Capital Flows at Both Ends : 
Does It Work ?, Working Paper of the International Monetary Fund, no. 188. 
Giovannini, A. & Park, J. W. (1989). Capital Controls and International Trade Finance, National 
Bureau of Economic Research, no. 3112. 
Magud, N. E., Reinhart, C. M. & Rogoff, K. S. (2011). Capital Controls: Myth and Reality - A 
Portfolio Balance Approach, National Bureau of Economic Research, no. 16805. 
Ostry, J. D., Ghosh, A. R., Habermeier, K., Chamon, M., Qureshi, M. S. & Reinhardt, D. B. S. 
(2010). Capital Inflows : The Role of Controls, International Monetary Fund, no. 4. 
Robbins, M., Saunders, J. & Kilmer, B. (2015). A Framework for Synthetic Control Methods 
with High-Dimensional , Micro-Level Data: Evaluating a Neighborhood-Specific Crime 
Intervention, RAND Working Paper.  
 
29 
 
Samitas, A. & Polyzos, S. (2016). Freeing Greece from Capital Controls : Were the Restrictions 
Enforced in Time ?, Research in International Business and Finance, [e-journal] vol. 37, no. 
December 2015, pp.196–213, Available Online: 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ribaf.2015.11.005. 
Sovich, D 2016, Synthetic Control Methods, PowerPoint presentation, Empirical Methods, 
Washington University in St. Louis. Available from: 
http://students.olin.wustl.edu/~sovichd/ecf_course_notes.html. [6 June 2017]. 
Tamirisa, N. (1999). Exchange and Capital Controls as Barriers to Trade, IMF Staff Papers, vol. 
46, no. 1, pp.69–88. 
www.investopedia.com. 2017. Capital Control. [ONLINE] Available at: 
http://www.investopedia.com/terms/c/capital_conrol.asp. [Accessed 10 July 2017]. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
